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IN f'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DORIS STARZEL and
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through Office of Recovery
Services, State Department of Social Services,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

JOHNNY JARAMILLO,
•.

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 18374

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to establish that appellant, Johnny
Jaramillo, is the father of Chad Starzel, who was born out of
wedlock on August 20, 1977, and to establish appellant's past
and ongoing child support obligation with respect to Chad Starzel.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Default judgment was entered against appellant on
March 11, 1982.

Appellant's subsequent motion to set aside the

default judgment was denied by the Honorable Boyd Bunnell on
April 19, 1982.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmation of the trial court's
judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This suit was begun by respondents in December of
1980.

Appellant's attorney at that time, Walter R. Ellett,

served appellant's answer on the Carbon County Attorney's Office
on December 22, 1980.

Respondents_~---

first set of interrogatories

was served upon appellant's attorney on May 20, 1980.

It appears

that· Mr-. - Ellett provided appellant a copy of the _interrogatories
for his answer (Tr. 57).

Appellant failed to answer respondents'

interrogatories within the thirty (30) day time
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

l~mit

imposed by

Then Deputy

Carbon County Attorney, Gene Strate, wrote Walter Ellett a letter
on July 13, 1981, requesting an answer to respondents' interrogatories (Tr. 61).

Another letter requesting a response to respondent

interrogatories was set to Mr. Ellett by Mr. Strate on August 25,
1981 (Tr. 61).

A third letter was sent to Mr. Ellett on September

17, 1981, by then Deputy Carbon County Attorney, Fred Howard.

Mr.

Howard requested that an answer to respondents' interrogatories be
supplied immediately (Tr. 61).

Mr. Ellett responded to Mr. Howard

by letter dated September 23, 1981, and stated that he would be
meeting with appellant personally to get his answers (Tr. 61, 62).
No response was submitted so Mr. Howard wrote Mr. Ellett on

-2-
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October 28, 1981, and advised Mr. Ellett that he intended to
file a motion for sanctions if answers were not received within
three (3) weeks (Tr. 62).

A motion to compel discovery was

filed with the trial court on November 30, 1981.

An order giving

appellant ten (10) days to answer respondents' interrogatories
was entered by the court (Tr. 3).

When appellant failed to answer

respondents' interrogatories pursuant to the court's order, a
motion to strike appellant's answer was filed.

Notice of that

motion was served upon Mr. Ellett on January 26, 1982 (Tr. 41).
Mr. Ellett advised appellant by letter which appellant received
on or about February 3, 1982, that he had received a motion to
._-

strike his answer and

th~t

it was imperative

., .. , :
-=-·

t~at

appellant

contact him, sirice a failure to answer respondents' interrogatories could result in action by the court adverse to appellant's
interests (Tr. 57).

Appellant then sought to hire another

attorney (Tr. 57, 58).
February 23, 1982.

Hearing on respondents' motion was held

Neither appellant or his attorney appeared.

The court struck appellant's answer and authorized respondents
to enter appellant's default.

Default hearing was held on March 6,

1982, at which time appellant was found to be the father of Chad
Starzel.

Judgment to that effect was entered against appellant

on March 11, 1982.

A motion to set aside judgment was filed by

appellant's new attorney, Phil Hansen, on March 23, 1982.

An

order denying appellant's motion to set aside judgment was entered
by the court on April 19, 1982.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE
APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.
Appellant's motion to set aside default judgment was
made pursuant to Rule 60(b){l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

• :

-·· ,J

On motion and upon such terms as are just.
the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; ... The motion
shall be made within a-reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than
three months after the judgment, order; or proceeding was entered or taken ....
.

.......

- . .;

.

-

On its face Rule 60(b) makes it clear that the moving
party must show "excusable neglect" which led to the judgment
and that application for relief was made in a timely fashion.
This court has recognized this two-fold approach to motions under
Rule 60(b) or its statutory predecessors, Mayhew v. Standard
Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962).
Various policies and rules of review have been articulated by this court which are to be considered in deciding
whether or not a judgment should be set aside for excusable neglect.
Paramount among the rules which this court has employed in the
past is the rule that the decision of the trial court regarding
a motion to set aside judgment under Rule 60(b) will only be

-4-
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disturbed on appeal for a manifest abuse of discretion, Heath
v. Mower, Utah, 597 P.2d 855 (1979).
It is true, as appellant indicates in his brief,
that this court has additionally advised liberality in construing the remedy provided by Rule 60(b) to the end that cases
may be decided on their merits.

But as the language in Warren

...

'

~

..

..

v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), indicates
the-policy of liberality is to be applied at the trial court

, r .• ..--'° 7 t

...\. ....1 ~·

level:
.. \;~.:

)

The rule that the courts will incline toward
granting relief to a party who has not had
the opportunity to present his case is ordinarily applied at the trial court lev·e1, and
this court will not reverse the trial court ...
merely because the motion could have been granted.

See also Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65,
513 P.2d 429 (1973).
The task of the trial court upon appellant's motion
to set aside for "mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect",
besides determining whether appellant's motion was timely, was
to review the facts and circumstances of the case to see if
they supported appellant's claim of excusable neglect, Heath,
supra.
The meaning of excusable neglect has been addressed by
this court in Board of Education of the Granite School District v.
Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 (1963):
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It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to
vacate a default judgment where there is
reasonable justification for the defendant's
failure to appear and answer. However, the
excuse must be reasonable to constitute
excusable neglect.
(emphasis added)
In addition this court has required that the moving party show
he acted with due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he has no control, Peterson
.

,/'

v. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 P. 860 (1905); Helgesen
Utah, 636 P.2d 1079 (1981).

.

,. ..

'

v-:~--Inyangumia,

Other jurisdictions have defined

excusable neglect as .neglect
that might be expected on the part
.
.
of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. Cleek v.
.

Virginia Gold Mining & Milling Co., 63 Idaho 445, 122 P.2d 232 (1942
With regard to the showing appellant has made, it should
be noted at the outset that appellant makes no claim, either in
his motion and affidavit to set aside judgment, or in his brief,
that surprise of any kind justifies opening the judgment of the
trial court.

Indeed, after a review of appellant's motion to set

aside default judgment, his affidavit in support of his motion
and his brief, the only language that can be found that appears
to suggest a factual basis for appellant's motion is as follows:
Appellant also presents a reasonable justification for setting aside the default
judgment .... Appellant should not be judged
by his former counsel's apparent neglect in
getting answers to the interrogatories ....
(Appellant's brief at 6.)
The allegation does not seem to be one of mistake or inadvertence, but rather that Mr. Ellett, appellant's first attorney,
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was negligent in failing to provide respondents with answers
to their interrogatories, and that counsel's negligence should
not be imputed to appellant.

Though appellant makes no claim

that Mr. Ellett's alleged negligence was excusable, the implication is clear that appellant's failure to respond to interrogatories,
and ultimately his failure to appear for trial, was excusable
neglect due to his attorney's actions.

Whether appellant relies

on his .own neglect, .or the alleged neglect of Mr. Ellett, he must
show that the neglect was excusable, Peterson, supra.
The trial court obviously decided that whatever neglect
existed was inexcusable.
finding.
..

The record in this case supports that

In addition, the record supports the proposition that

if there was inexcusable neglect in this case it was very likely
appellant's neglect and not that of Mr. Ellett.

The second

paragraph of appellant's affidavit in support of his motion to
set aside states:
That on or about the 3rd day of February,
1982, [appellant] received a letter from his
counsel of record, Walter R. Ellett, informing
him that Mr. Ellett was in receipt of a motion
to strike his answer [in the case before the
court] because the interrogatories that had
previously been sent to him had not been
answered. Mr. Ellett also informed him that
it was imperative that he contact him, since
a failure to respond to .the interrogatories
could result in the court entering an order
that may not be to his best interest.
(Tr. 57)
Appellant's affidavit clearly shows that Mr. Ellett advised
appellant of the urgency of answering respondents' interrogatories at least one month before default judgment was taken.
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It

also leads one to believe that Mr. Ellett had previously provided appellant with respondents' interrogatories for his
answer.

It should be pointed out that nowhere in the record

presently before the court does ·appellant allege that Mr. Ellett
failed to provide him with respondents' interrogatories or that
he attempted to answer those interrogat.ories, or that Mr. Ellett
failed to advise him of .the importance of answering those interrogatories.

As has been indicated, the.contrary appears.
Appellant's brief, likewise, fails to state any strong

-justification for appellant's neglect of this case.

Appellant

tries to lay the blame for his· failure to respond to respondents'
interrogatories at the feet of Walter Ellett:
are weakly characterized in .appellant IS brief

Mr. Ellett's actions

as

"apparent neglect.

And as if to retract the allegation of neglect on Mr. Ellett's
part, appellant's-brief then says:
Present counsel feels it is inappropriate
to emphasize the acts of prior counsel as
an excuse for any delays, and would rather
emphasize the pursuit with which present
counsel has handled the case on appeal ....
(Appellant's brief at 7.)
-

... '

-

--

~

.

:...:..

~

Respondents do not contend that appellant's motion
i

J

..

•

_.

;~~

was untimely -- respondents' position,is that appellant has
..... ,. . '

.)

completely failed to show facts that amount to "excusable
neglect".

Appellant's actions, in light of the warning sent

to him February 3, 1982, by Walter Ellett, were totally unreasonable.

Instead bf answering Mr. Ellett, he chose to ignore

-8-
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.

his letter and hire new counsel.

The trial court was completely

justified in finding appellant's neglect inexcusable.

This

court's statement in Warren is applicable to the case now before
the court:
In-order for this court to overturn the
discretion of the lower court in refusing to
vacate a valid judgment, the. requirements of
public policy demand more than a mere statement
that a person did not have his day in court
when full opportunity for a fair hearing was
afforded to him or his legal representative.
Appellant was given more. than ample time to answer respondents'
. ~

. : (, .

(.

interrogatories, ·and fair warning by his own attorney of the
(

consequences of his failure to do so.
.... •.···

Appellant obviously could
.

have prevented default judgment at any time prior to judgment
by simply responding to Walter Ellett's letter or the
tories Mr. Ellett sent him.

interroga~

He should not be heard to complain

now that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
grant his motion to set aside judgment.

CPNCLUSION
Respondents are entitled to retain the benefits of
'

a great deal of time and effort that went into obtaining a
judgment against appellant unless he has shown that the trial
court abused its discretion in not granting his motion.

The

record is devoid of any showing by appellant that his neglect
of this case was reasonable, or that he acted with due diligence,
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or that he acted as a reasonable person would in the same circumstances.

The record does show that respondent requested
'

answers to their interrogatories at least four times and that
appellant had in excess of eight months to answer but failed
to do so.

Appellant's failure to_

answ~r

interrogatories or

appear at trial was inexcusable and the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ,this

J q.f.k

day of March, 1983.

KEITH H. CHIARA
Carbon County Attorney
- ~Carbon County Courthouse
Price, Utah 84501
Attorney for Respondents
.}

.

B/J?~c~
·~cL~
RANDY A. HUDSO
Chief D:pu;y County Attorney
CERTJFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing

Brief of Respondents were served this

«V6k day of March,

on the office of Phil L. Hansen, Hansen an
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

Hansen, 800 Boston
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